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Tanks and armor are not a big deal-the planes are the killers. 1 
can handle everything but the jet fighters.l 
- TALIBAN COMMANDER, june 2008 
When we hear the planes overhead, we feel relief because we 
know it is going to be over, and we are probably not going to die 
that day.2 
-U.S. ARMY SERGEANT, September 2008 
In the twenty-first century, perspective matters. To America's adversaries 
in the field, U.S. air capabilities, including those of the U.S. Air Force, are 
a terrifying threat, far more intimidating than many other elements of 
American power. From the perspective of an American infantryman in 
the midst of combat, airpower is a psychological-not only a physical-
lifesaver. 
Yet in the salons of newspapers, think tanks, and academia, and even 
among its sister services and other government entities, the air force is the 
gang that can't shoot straight. During the same month in which the Taliban 
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone, and not 
necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any of its components. 
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commander quoted in the epigraph gave his rather strong testimonial about 
the effectiveness of airpower, the editors of the Washington Post derided 
the air force as "adrift,"3 and those of the New York Times condemned it as 
"dysfunctional." Functionality, it seems, is much a matter of perspective+ 
Notwithstanding success on actual battlefields, the U.S. Air Force finds 
itself suffering setbacks in the all-important area of operation that is 
Washington. Already battered by allegations of improprieties in awarding 
contracts, and beset with difficulties in communicating its purpose and 
vision, the service staggered under revelations that nuclear-related materials 
had been mishandled. As the incidents were interpreted as failures of 
leadership, the air forces secretary and chief of staff were ousted, and other 
senior leaders suffered career-ending accountability actions.s 
More fundamentally, however, the Air Forces sense of itself is under 
siege. As the service that prides itself on its ability to keep the worlds most 
dangerous existential threats at bay, it nevertheless is finding that contempo-
rary defense thinking undervalues that ability Indeed, it has never been 
more fashionable to discount the need for the kind of firepower the Air 
Force best provides and to mock the very suggestion that we are likely to do 
battle against another modem army-let alone an air force. Even Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates categorized apprehensions about such possibilities 
as "next -war-itis. "6 
With few airpower advocates in the Office of the Secretary of Defense,? 
it is not surprising that the National Defense Strategy, issued in june 
of 2008, perpetuated an approach to national security planning which 
heavily emphasizes "irregular war," epitomized by the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 8 While acknowledging the notion of hedging against the 
emergence of a peer-competitor, the document unmistakably focuses on 
conflicts with nonstate actors at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. 
Specifically, it states that "for the foreseeable future, winning the Long 
War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of 
the U.S."9 
Unless airmen can do a better job of explaining to decision makers 
how air, space, and cyberspace power provides potent, full-spectrum capa-
bilities to the joint team, the focus of the National Defense Strategy does 
not spell good news for the Air Force.lO In popular imagination, not to men-
tion the minds of key leaders, waging irregular warfare against extremism 
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is overwhelmingly the province of the ground forces. Fueling this view are 
the heretofore rarely challenged assumptions about Field Manual (FM) 3-24, 
the army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine issued in 
December 2006.11 Specifically, there is a widespread belief that principles 
enunciated in FM 3-24 were wholly responsible for suppressing violence 
in Iraq. 
Of course, as I will go on to show, there is strong empirical data 
demonstrating that airpower was, in fact, vital to the joint success in Iraq 
beginning in 2007. But that evidence has not penetrated very far into the 
public consciousness. The belief that the manual is the sine qua non of 
COIN is significant-if not alarming-for the air force, since the doctrine 
conceives of only a very limited role for airpower, confining its discussion 
largely to a five-page annex. Consequently, many wrongly believe that air-
power has little relevance to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
More disconcerting is that, to the extent airpower is employed to fight 
insurgencies, many believe it is actually undermining the supposedly all-
important centerpiece of counterinsurgency, that is, winning "hearts and 
minds. "12 In so concluding, they point to reports in the summer of 2008 
that air strikes in Afghanistan were responsible for needless civilian deaths. 
To their way of thinking, the military can prevent such casualties by restrain-
ing the use of airpower in favor of more U.S. ground troops. 13 
All of this combines to create an atmosphere so poisoned that some 
pundits question the very rationale for having an air force.l4 The irony of 
the situation is that more than any other service, the air force has dominated 
the physical domains in which it operates. While the ground forces 
still struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan to defeat lightly armed insurgents 
whom they typically greatly outnumber, the U.S. Air Force has made short 
work of every aerial opponent it has faced, including top-of-the-line 
Russian-built aircraft in Serbia. For its part, Saddam Husseins air force was 
so petrified of facing American pilots that it literally buried its airplanes to 
avoid doing so. 
The purpose of this essay is to outline several of the sources of the Air 
Forces difficulties, discuss some Air Force successes, and offer a few thoughts 
for the way ahead. It is uncompromising on one point: if the Air Forces crit-
ics succeed in deconstructing the worlds most successful military force, the 
security of the United States will be in real jeopardy 
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Air Force Culture and Leadership Development 
Identifying the underlying cause of the Air Forces problematic state is no 
easy task. As would be the case with any large and complicated organization, 
there are multiple causes for the services current institutional difficulties. 
Still, it is always useful to examine leadership development when an organ-
ization is not meeting its own expectations or those of others. This exami-
nation suggests that the Air Forces leadership development process and its 
institutional culture intertwine in a way that may not be best serving its 
interests in the twenty-first century 
Let us begin with the current situation: it is indisputable that the Air 
Force has relatively few senior officers filling the leadership posts deemed 
most influential in national security policymaking.lS Equally troubling is 
that the service has few flag officers able to act in the larger defense com-
munity as effective spokespersons and advocates for airpower.l6 
Likewise, the Air Force has not-as the army has-produced a cadre of 
warrior-intellectuals.l7 Rare is the Air Force general who combines front-line 
combat experience with a broad-based PhD. In other words, the Air Force 
simply does not have combined in a single senior officer the qualities that 
have helped to make army general David H. Petraeus so successful and 
so widely admired as the prototype of military leadership for the twenty-
first century 
The career path of most airmen makes it difficult to mirror the back-
ground of a Petraeus. The relatively lengthy training undertaken by aviators 
(who form the core of the services senior leadership) leaves little time for the 
advanced study required for a PhD. Beyond an initial year of undergraduate 
pilot training, officers must continually fly to stay current in the increas-
ingly complex aircraft used by todays Air Force. Over a career, the weeks 
and months of training needed to maintain essentially the same flying skills 
a company grade officer uses detract from the time available to acquire the 
kind of education most important at the senior level. 
The result is that few who go on to command major Air Force organiza-
tions have a doctorate on their resume. Of course, there are many well-
educated officers in the Air Force. More than half have a postgraduate 
degree, 18 and most flag officers have at least a masters degree in some 
specialty The Air Force does continue to "chum out scores of airmen with 
~ 
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advanced degrees," as the former secretary of the Air Force recently observed, 
but many of the advanced degrees are in science and engineering.l9 Indeed, 
a study by Colonel Tom Ruby points out the "relative paucity" of Air Force 
senior officers "with doctorates applicable to strategy development."20 
The emphasis on the hard sciences colors the outlook of many Air Force 
officers on a variety of issues to a point where it much defines the culture of 
the service. Although the in-depth knowledge of these officers enables them 
to understand the intricacies of the many advanced systems the Air Force 
employs, it can put them at a disadvantage in a world in which the skills of 
the liberally educated are increasingly valued in leadership positions. Nor 
does the assignment process close the gap. One study argues that airmen 
do not compete well for major theater commands because they have "a 
narrower upbringing and less exposure to the political process than other 
service members."2l 
Again, Air Force culture plays a role in accentuating this deficiency 
Beyond the training demands that keep them in the cockpit, the sheer love 
of flying creates a dislike for the developmental staff jobs so essential to the 
leadership of twenty-first century militaries. For instance, most experts agree 
that effective military strategy must take into account a range of political, 
social, moral, and economic matters in addition to those purely military in 
nature.22 The narrower upbringing of Air Force officers often does not allow 
them to internalize adequately these important disciplines, and leaves them 
with a tendency to analyze problems from a scientific and technological 
perspective, which can in turn make them less adept at integrating the 
other important factors into their thinking. 
Air force thinking does devote much intellectual energy to examining 
and optimizing the characteristics of its technologies, as well as the mechan-
ics of procuring and maintaining them. However, creatively envisioning 
the strategic employment of air, space, and cyberspace power gets markedly 
less attention. Put another way, the Air Force is culturally more interested in 
encyclopedic knowledge of the specifications of its equipment than in how 
to best use that equipment across the spectrum of conflict. That the late Carl 
Builder identified virtually the same problem in the early 1990s only serves 
to underline how entrenched it is culturally23 
For all the technical expertise of airmen, some officers argue that 
todays Air Force suffers from anti-intellectualism, that is, from "valuing 
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doers over thinkers."24 According to Colonel Ruby, "Technical proficiency 
cannot substitute for an ability to analyze issues critically and apply every 
asset available to achieve a specific end in differing political and military 
contexts."25 This suggests another issue that bedevils the Air Force: the 
science and engineering propensities of airmen render them less than fully 
sensitive to the human dimension of the art of war making. 
This insensitivity can harm the Air Force in unexpected ways. For 
example, the Air Forces concept of centralized control and decentralized 
execution of airpower has led to an unfortunate assumption by its comrades 
in arms, particularly in the army The Air Force relies on advanced commu-
nications methodologies that permit the comprehensive command and 
control of its capabilities from a single air and space operations center in a 
given theater of operations26 Typically, the operations center is physically 
separate from the operations center of the overall joint force commander. 
Thus senior Air Force commanders were not co-located with the overall 
joint force commander in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Theoretical efficiencies 
aside, the physical absence of Air Force flag officers from the councils of 
war conducted by army and Marine Corps generals in Iraq and Afghanistan 
prevented the development of the kind of personal bonds that produce 
mutual respect and understanding. Moreover, it seems to have created 
suspicion among some ground-component officers that the Air Force lacks 
sufficient understanding of or, worse, concern about, their needs. 
The failure to fully appreciate the importance of developing these 
personal bonds does not bode well for the future. Compared to the army and 
the Marine Corps, the Air Force has far fewer officers destined for senior 
rank with extended service in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Many top Air 
Force officers who have served in the Middle East did so at the site of the 
air operations center or at another airbase located outside of those countries. 
As a practical matter, as Iraq and Afghanistan veterans assume higher lead-
ership positions in the army and Marine Corps, this divergence in experi-
ence may create further difficulties for the Air Force in its relationship with 
the ground forces. 
Likewise, it may be hard to place Air Force officers, however otherwise 
talented, in positions of prominence either in joint commands or in key 
positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Understandably, those 
with service in Iraq or Afghanistan will likely be favored since they will 
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presumably be more cognizant of the nuances of contemporary conflicts. 
This will result in combatant commands responsible for the areas of proba-
ble conflict dominated by officers not in the Air Force. Because of the 
extraordinary-and growing-authority of these four-star joint commands, 
the absence of airmen from the upper ranks of the most important ones is 
worrisome for those who believe that the air weapon has an irreplaceable 
role to play in protecting the nations interests. 
Today, there is a growing tendency for combatant commanders, embold-
ened by supportive Defense Department polices, to attempt to expand their 
authority at the expense of individual services. Consider, for example, the 
effort by Marine Corps general james N. Mattis, the commander of joint 
Forces Command, to expunge the concept of effects-based operations (EBO) 
even though it is fundamental to Air Force doctrine.27 There are many 
arguments for and against EBO, but suffice it to say that at its core, EBO 
focuses on achieving certain effects desired by the commander without 
particular concern for which service or platform accomplishes the neces-
sary tasks.28 
To be sure, it is possible that the Marines could consider EBO a threat to 
their air-ground task force approach.29 For example, the implementation of 
EBO might require making all aviation assets available for theater-wide 
tasking based upon the joint force commanders highest priorities-that is, 
airpower would not be reserved for use at the corps' discretion. In that case, 
the Marines could see EBO as disrupting the air-ground synergy that they 
believe their style of warfare requires, and hence as undermining the combat 
power of Marine formations to the detriment of the overall effort. 
Regardless, for a combatant commander to use his joint authority to 
attempt to demolish another services operational approach is, to say the least, 
unprecedented. Retired Air Force lieutenant general Thomas Mcinerney 
termed General Mattiss memo "parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided," and 
pointed out further that EBO had been "key in the transformation of war-
fare-and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 
20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."30 Yet such bureaucratic eviscera-
tions of Air Force doctrine are what happen when too few airmen occupy key 
joint billets, and-importantly-when the service is perceived as vulnerable. 
Additionally, the Air Forces "engineering" mind-set tends to generate a 
rather naive belief that the efficacy of its capabilities are self-evident. Many 
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airmen seem to assume that decision makers will readily engage in a dispas-
sionate, almost mathematical analysis of available data, which will irrefutably 
demonstrate the utility and value of airpower and the Air Force. In such a 
conception of the world, advocacy per se is wholly unnecessary and, indeed, 
a bit unseemly In the real world, of course, advocating particular policies or 
arguing for alternatives requires a far more aggressive approach than merely 
computing numbers and presenting spreadsheets. The numbers do not, nec-
essarily, speak for themselves. 
All of this is in stark contrast to what the other services have mastered. 
The armys development of FM 3-24 is a classic example of savvy twenty-
first-century policymaking. During the developmental stage of the doctrine, 
the army invited comment from a range of representatives from outside 
the military, including the media, academia, and think tanks_3l The army 
drafters of the manual gave the inputs from these unconventional sources 
more than just a respectful hearing; in many instances their suggestions were 
wholly adopted. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the final document was praised for 
the very characteristics so admired by some civilian intellectuals and 
academics-notwithstanding the opaqueness of these characteristics in 
terms of military doctrine.32 As one commentator explained, FM 3-24 
was popular 
among sections of the countrys liberal-minded intelligentsia. 
This was warfare for northeastern graduate students--complex, 
blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than 
destroy them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a 
doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never own 
a gun_33 
What this process did, in effect, was to disarm potential adversaries-those 
ordinarily likely to oppose almost anything coming out of the armed 
forces-by giving them intellectual ownership of the doctrine produced. 
This generated an outpouring of flattery from a myriad of unusual venues, 
including an almost obsequious review in the New York Times Book Review)4 
Much of what the manual was understood to advocate was not, in 
fact, what proved successful in Iraq during the period of its supposed 
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implementation in 2007 and 2008;35 but its public perception as calling for 
a "kinder and gentler" form of war making with little use for airpower 
remains firmly in place. At least insofar as FM 3-24s reputation for passivity 
is concerned, it seems to be more a product of the wishful thinking of some 
of the manuals fans than the machinations of its drafters. General Petraeus, 
one of the manuals principal authors, insists that it does not "shy away from 
the need to kill the enemy" and that "the words 'kill' and 'capture' are on 
every page."36 
Nevertheless, respected trade publications such as Defense News were 
claiming as late as September of 2008 that the "Army and Marines are 
succeeding in Iraq, thanks to a softer approach."37 Regardless of what the 
manual does or does not say, the much-derided techniques of "killing 
and capturing" both spiked during this most successful period of the Iraq 
War, and-importantly-airpower became key to that effort as air strikes 
increased fivefold in 2007.38 Retired Air Force lieutenant general Michael 
Dunn, the president of the Air Force Association, characterized the counter-
insurgency effort in this way in july of 2008: 
The so-called troop surge has really been an airpower surge. 
Consider this. Air sorties are up 85%; air strikes are up 400%; 
weight of ordnance dropped is up 1000%. Some insiders say that 
90% of the terrorists being killed are being killed by airpower.39 
Notwithstanding the enormous role airpower played (and continues 
to play) in counterinsurgency operations, the Washington Post accurately 
observes that the "public faces of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been 
almost exclusively those of troops in Army and Marine Corps uniforms. "40 
Thus, the army, despite years of botched strategies (as recorded in such 
books as Tom Rickss Fiasco4l), has been able to reinvent its "brand" to be 
that of an intellectual, forward-thinking institution. 
To meet its larger manpower recruiting need and facilitate this transfor-
mational rebranding, the army enjoys a significantly larger advertising budg-
et than that of the Air Force. Beyond its paltry marketing budget, the 
Air Force has been burdened with its problematic "Above All" advertising 
campaign, which viewers have found alternatively inscrutable and arro-
gant.42 While all service advertising efforts seek to appeal to recruits by 
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projecting a sense of organizational uniqueness and excellence, the Air 
Forces slogan turned out to be self-defeating. It is almost (but not quite) 
understandable that the Air Force frequently has found itself denounced as 
an organization wedded to outdated Cold War concepts.43 
The army (and the Marine Corps) have also benefited from scores of 
books, articles, and broadcasts that-whatever their view of the leader-
ship-treated the individual soldier or marine with great sympathy The rea-
son is easy to discern: those who produced the most favorable commentary 
usually had been embedded with ground units. The army's own study of the 
Iraq war, On Point II, recognizes the effect this had by quoting Los Angeles 
Times reporter john Hendren: 
When you're living in tents with these guys and eating what they 
eat and cleaning the dirt off the glasses, its a whole different expe-
rience. You definitely have a concern about knowing people so 
well that you sympathize with them.44 
On Point II downplays the phenomenon by insisting rather illogically that the 
reporting of embedded journalists was not biased, even though the authors 
came to "understand the Soldiers with whom they lived and who protected 
them from danger."45 In truth, there is little doubt that the association with 
the vibrant personalities of Americas young soldiers and marines who were 
protecting them from very real threats was influential, and this "understand-
ing" boosted the ground services' image overall. 
The Air Force has little hope of engendering favorable press the same 
way The nature of the services operations is such that it does not lend itself 
to the embedding of reporters. Embeds rarely find themselves in the cockpit 
of an airplane46 or, for that matter, in the confines of an unmanned aerial 
system (UAS) or satellite. It is quite rare for an airman to have a human-
interest story related to Air Force capabilities that is as captivating as that of 
his infantry counterpart fighting amid the sights, sounds, and smells of 
ground combat. 
Regrettably, to the extent there are human-interest stories about airpower 
coming out of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are typically negative 
ones, emphasizing the tragedy of civilian deaths. Air Force "stories" tend to 
revolve around technology rather than people. Given the relative paucity of 
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authors with the interest and background to write animatedly about the 
technology that underpins the Air Force way of war, the service~ difficulties 
in explaining itself are not hard to understand. 
In certain respects, the Air Force has been its own worst enemy 
Beginning with the distribution of videos of precision bombs falling into air-
shafts during the first Gulf War, the service has created the perception that 
what it does is easy In every conflict for more than half a century, the Air 
Force has provided near-perfect air defense as well as long-range strikes and 
theater and strategic lift; as a result, the service garners little thought or con-
sideration by its beneficiaries. The U.S. national defense community cava-
lierly considers these resources as givens, though of course virtually no other 
air force in the world can provide these capabilities. 
The situation is even more aggravated with respect to costly and intricate 
space systems. Here, too, Air Force capabilities are taken for granted. The 
Secretary of the Air Force recently noted that in the Middle East, "U.S. and 
Coalition forces are supported by over 46 satellites, along with their network 
of operations centers and ground stations, operated by airmen at bases 
across the globe."47 Yet the Air Force~ sister services seem at best to recog-
nize only vaguely that these are Air Force-furnished resources. 
Beyond being taken for granted, the Air Force also must deal with the 
perception that its high-tech weaponry is easier to control than is really 
the case. Consider this statement by a former member of the National 
Security Council: 
Air power is more susceptible to legal and policy adjustment than 
ground combat, in light of the variations in means and method 
of attack available through variation in munitions, delivery 
azimuth, angle of attack, aim point, fuse, and explosive, all 
amplified with the assistance of computer simulation.48 
This type of overstatement, which implies that Air Force weaponry is per-
fectly controllable, exacerbates criticism when things seem to go awry There 
is little appreciation for the vagaries of combat; the assumption is that any 
unintended result is due to malfeasance. 
The air force has not effectively conveyed the vulnerability of the 
current force or, equally important, the fragility of the supporting industrial 
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base. Although key decision makers seem cognizant of the services aging 
fleet, they evidently believe the looming deficiencies do not merit immedi-
ate attention. Accordingly, decisions concerning the production of the 
F-22 fighter and the acquisition of a new tanker were left to the new 
administration. 49 
Even respected experts like Professor Richard K. Betts of Columbia 
University appear to misapprehend the lead time required to manufacture 
and field air, space, and cyberspace technology Betts argues that hedging 
against a peer-competitor threat like China merely requires a "mobilization 
strategy"50 By this he means putting off the production of weaponry "until 
genuine evidence" exists that military supremacy is slipping.sl But waiting 
until the threat actually exists is often waiting too long to produce success-
ful counters. Consider how long it took to field the relatively low-tech Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. 52 
Apparently, Professor Betts-and presumably other national security 
experts-are unaware that once the production line for a high-tech weapon 
like an advanced aircraft terminates, it may take years to regenerate it. 
There is no "mobilization strategy" that is meaningful for a service that 
depends upon superior technology for its military effectiveness. Once a 
threat is actually materializing, it is most likely too late to address it by the 
manufacture of new equipment. To paraphrase an erstwhile defense leader, 
"you go to war with the air force you have; not the one you want." 
An Airpower Renaissance? 
Do all of these issues mean the Air Force is doomed to be underappreciated 
and underresourced, and hence undervalued as an instrument of national 
power? Actually, no. Despite its many ills, airpower-if not the Air Force 
itself-is enjoying a renaissance of sorts. Rather surprisingly, this is nowhere 
more evident than in counterinsurgency operations. 
The details of the revolutionary changes that have made airpower 
such a capability of choice in counterinsurgency operations are avail-
able elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that airpower "persistence and preci-
sion" technologies-many of which have been only recently fielded-
have led influential strategists to insist that the nature of warfare has 
... 
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fundamentally changed. In the fall of 2007, retired army general Barry 
McCaffrey observed: 
We have already made a 100 year war-fighting leap-ahead 
with MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and Global Hawk. Now 
we have loiter times in excess of 24 hours, persistent eyes on 
target, micro-kill with Hellfire and 500 lb JDAM bombs, 
synthetic aperture radar, and a host of ISR [intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance] sensors and communications 
potential that have fundamentally changed the nature of 
warfare. 53 
In essence, profound advances in the ability to conduct persistent and pre-
cise ISR, complemented by the availability of precise strikes, have combined 
to create a new way of war, one that is increasingly problematic for low-tech 
insurgents to counter. Perhaps even more importantly, these new high-tech 
capabilities make it possible for airpower to have a strategic effect not on 
civilian morale, as airpower pioneers once sought, but on the minds of the 
actual combatants. 54 
As the first of the epigraphs to this chapter suggests, today airpower 
can inflict on insurgents a sense of helplessness that is psychologically debil-
itating. Commanders seem to understand this development. According to 
counterinsurgency expert Colin Kahl, air strikes in Iraq increased dramati-
cally in 2007 partly because of the realization of their ability to affect the 
enemy$ psychology 55 In fact, hints about the psychological effect of preci-
sion aerial fires had appeared even earlier. General Tommy Franks relates 
that during his tenure in command, an Afghan ally told him that the 
AC-130 gunship is "a famous airplane [whose] guns have destroyed the 
spirit of the Taliban and the Arabs."56 
The psychological unhinging of today$ insurgents by contemporary 
airpower is apparent in more than just the battlespaces of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia (FARC, in its 
Spanish acronym), the main insurgent group in Colombia, is being deva-
stated by desertions which, according to interviews with former rebels, 
are much motivated by "the sheer terror of being bombed by Colombian 
fighter planes."57 
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In American counterinsurgency operations, the phenomenal growth of 
robotic aeronautical platforms makes it possible to achieve almost Pavlovian 
psychological reactions. As one report put it: 
Iraqi insurgents have learned to fear the drones. 'They hear 
some sort of air noise and they don't know exactly what it is, 
but they know it's associated with 'my buddy getting killed,"' says 
[a U.S. soldier].S8 
The sheer inability to defend against airpower no doubt contributes to 
its devastating psychological effect, as insurgents have few weapons capable 
of holding high-performance aircraft at risk.59 In fact, the greatest threat 
to airpower in counterinsurgency operations is not a weapon at all, but 
rather misperceptions about its relationship to civilian casualties, especially 
in Afghanistan. 
The Civilian Casualty Conundrum 
It is, of course, true that aerial fires-like ground-based fires-can cause civil-
ian causalities. 60 However, there is no question that Taliban and al Qaeda are 
stepping up their sophisticated effort to turn every tragedy into a political 
issue.61 Unfortunately, they are enjoying significant success. According to the 
chief NATO spokesman, the coalition "is definitely not winning the informa-
tion war."62 Part of the problem is clearly bureaucratic. As the Washington Post 
explains: "Although civilian deaths have been frequent and real, officials say 
that the Taliban quickly broadcasts exaggerated tolls, stoking public anger, 
while foreign military officers may take days to respond. "63 
There is a real risk that the Taliban may succeed in pressuring coalition 
forces to virtually abandon airpower. Misinformation is playing a role. 
Friendly forces do not seem to understand that it is not wise to declare that 
every civilian death, however tragic, is the product of an error. Too often, 
however, they seem to do just that. For example, the commander of NATOs 
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan recently insisted that 
"any civilian casualty caused by NATO or American forces is inadvertent."64 
This statement, together with earlier NATO statements suggesting that no 
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bombing would take place if it were known that civilians were in the area, 
can create serious military difficulties. 55 
International law prohibits targeting civilians, but it does not ban attacks 
on legitimate targets even if it is known that innocents will be killed as 
a result. Rather, the law requires only that such losses not be "excessive" 
in relation to the military advantage sought. 66 If the law were otherwise, 
it would simply encourage adversaries to use innocent civilians as 
human shields.67 
Of course, every effort must be made to limit civilian losses, but the 
requisite analysis ought to take into account those civilians who may be 
killed by Taliban and al Qaeda if these groups are allowed to escape an airstrike. 
Limiting civilian casualties requires as careful an assessment of the conse-
quences of not bombing as of the bombing itself. When civilian deaths occur 
in the course of an otherwise legitimate attack because the enemy is wrongly 
intermingling with civilians, the legal and moral responsibility for the deaths 
is upon the insurgents, not the attackers. Counterinsurgency forces would 
do well to make that clear to decision makers and the public. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be a rather widespread belief 
that more ground-force counterinsurgents will somehow reduce the number 
of civilian casualties. The evidence indicates otherwise. The air strikes that 
have recently caused the most civilian casualties were typically not pre-
planned in the air operations center, but were the product of actions taken 
at the behest of U.S. forces on the ground.68 Such strikes can lack the 
detailed vetting that otherwise takes place in the operations center target-
ing cell. As one journalist observes, such planning may include extended 
aerial surveillance that provides those in the operations center with "a better 
vantage point than an Army unit has just down the street from a group 
of insurgents."69 
When airpower is applied as the result of this kind of preplanning, 
even Human Rights Watch activist Marc Garlasoc concedes that "airstrikes 
probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists."70 However, when 
they are called for by troops on the ground, "not all air strikes can be so 
meticulously planned." This is the view of General James Conway, com-
mandant of the Marines, who points out that "U.S. or allied units can call in 
sudden strikes when they find themselves in a firefight or stumble on a 
meeting of Taliban leaders." He also makes clear how insurgents exploit 
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the imprecision of these unplanned attacks: "Sometimes its a conscious 
tactic of these people who meet to make sure there are kids playing in 
the compound so that they're seen, and that complicates your targeting 
methodology. ... This is a dirty game being played."7l 
In any event, troops on the ground do not necessarily equate to more 
discriminate targeting. journalist Mark Thompson-a frequent critic of 
airpower-admitted after a ground force raid that reportedly left as many as 
fifteen civilians dead that "having American soldiers in a position to call in 
strikes is no guarantee that civilians won't be killed. "72 
More troops on the ground mean more risk against which the air 
weapon may be the sole defensive recourse. This is especially so in 
Afghanistan, where the mountainous terrain leaves few other options for 
isolated garrisons undergoing unanticipated attacks that threaten to over-
run them. The desire to attack without the threat of retaliation by air may 
well be a principal motivation for the Taliban's propaganda efforts to dele-
gitimize airpower. 73 
Airpower and COIN 
Although it is unquestionably true that military means cannot alone achieve all 
the goals of a counterinsurgency effort, it is also accurate to say that in terms 
of suppressing violence, the strategy of "killing and capturing," as noted above, 
has proven more effective than expected. This strategy was presumed to rely 
on deployment of massive numbers of U.S. ground forces as counterinsur-
gents. FM 3-24, for example, calls for a "minimum troop density" of twenty 
counterinsurgents per thousand residents;74 it was such calculations that led 
to the "surge" of nearly thirty thousand American troops into Iraq in 2007. 
However, recent reports call into question the "more boots on the 
ground" theory Specifically, journalist Bob Woodward, author of the 
The War Within (about the surge phase of the Iraq War), insists that "at least 
three other factors were as important as, or even more important than, the 
surge" including operations that "locate, target and kill key individuals" in 
various insurgent groups_75 
This is a very significant truth for developing counterinsurgency strat-
egy for the United States because it is becoming increasingly clear that 
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deploying masses of American troops will always be problematic in irregular 
warfare situations, and especially so in the Middle East. Studies demonstrate 
that the presence of foreign forces nearly always invigorates an insurgency 
The "fundamental motivation" for insurgencies generally, expert William R. 
Polk maintains, is "to protect the integrity of the native group from foreign-
ers."76 This is especially so in Iraq.77 
Thus the desirability of airpower, which does not require a large "foot-
print" in a nation suffering from an insurgency, and perhaps requires none at 
all. This is not an especially new feature of the air weapon. What is new is 
the capacity to "target and kill" specific individuals, the exact capability 
Woodward says was so important in suppressing violence in Iraq. Consider 
this report from journalist Mark Benjamin: 
The Air Force recently watched one man in Iraq for more 
than five weeks, carefully recording his habits-where he lives, 
works and worships, and whom he meets. . . . The military 
may decide to have such a man arrested, or to do nothing at 
all. Or, at any moment they could decide to blow him 
to smithereensJS 
Similarly, the Los Angeles Times reported in April of 2008 that NATO forces 
in Afghanistan "recently have had unusual success in tracking and targeting 
mid-level Taliban field commanders, killing scores of them in pinpoint 
airstrikes. "79 Cases like this suggest that neutralizing individual insurgents is 
much more important to overall counterinsurgency success than FM 3-24 
and other approaches would indicate. 
The need for a counterinsurgency strategy that does not require 
large numbers of U.S. ground forces is very great. According to james S. 
Corum, the loss of blood and treasure in Iraq has so eroded domestic 
support for similar operations elsewhere that they are unlikely in the 
future, "no matter how necessary or justified they might be."SO Polls seem 
to bear this out. Even though the percentage of Americans who think 
the United States can win the war in Iraq rose to 58 percent in August of 
2008, the percentage opposing the war also rose to 60 percent-as did the 
percentage who thought the United States made a mistake to send troops 
to Iraq in the first place.Sl 
110 LESSONS FOR A LONG WAR 
Is Imitation Flattery or ... ? 
Perhaps the greatest endorsement of the efficacy of airpower in counter-
insurgency operations might be expressed in the maxim, "Imitation is the 
greatest form of flattery" Although airpower is seldom given much credit 
by the ground forces, it appears to some observers that the army nevertheless 
wants to build, in effect, its own air force.82 The armys acquisition of the Sky 
Warrior, a virtual replica of the Air Forces Predator unmanned aerial system, 
is but one piece of evidence among several that gives credence to this charge.83 
Another more graphic indicator came in june of 2008. Thorn Shanker of 
the New York Times reported that the army, charging the Air Force with irrel-
evance and an inability to meet its requests for "sophisticated surveillance 
aircraft," was developing its own aviation unit.84 The Wall Street]oumallater 
revealed that the "army is preparing to deploy a network of drones and other 
surveillance aircraft to Afghanistan."85 All of this is a tacit admission by the 
ground forces themselves that airpower has revolutionized counterinsur-
gency warfare, and that airpower is vastly more efficient and effective than 
certain manpower-intensive infantry modalities of the past. 
At the same time, there is little to suggest that ground forces understand 
and employ airpower more productively than does the Air Force. Consider 
that in Afghanistan, dubious army airpower planning for Operation 
Anaconda would have produced a disaster had not air force fixed-wing 
assets rescued the operation.86 Virtually the only conventional victory the 
Iraqi military achieved in 2003, moreover, was the defeat of an army Apache 
helicopter unit that left twenty-seven of thirty-three helicopters unable to 
fly87 Also telling, as Major Robert]. Seifert points out in a joint Forces 
Quarterly article, is how inefficiently ground commanders in Iraq used 
the AC-130 gunships; indeed, their strategy was disturbingly reminiscent of 
one that proved so ineffective in North Africa during World War n.ss The 
commanders limited the aircraft to providing air cover to specific units, and 
this made the gunships unavailable to attack emerging targets in another 
units area of operations. They failed to optimize each sortie by refusing to 
link the "on call" aircraft to several units, thus making it unable to respond 
to the one with the greatest need.89 
All of this makes some of the official writings of senior army officers 
quite curious. Army lieutenant general Michael Vane asserts in Defense 
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News that only soldiers at the "lowest echelon" (and not, he supposes, those 
at "25,000 feet or 10 miles off-shore") can "find, capture, and if necessary, 
kill" todays "religious extremists and nonstate actors. "90 Thus he claims 
that land power "needs more of [the] budget pie" than the other services. 
In another article, however, then-Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno 
claims that aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (as opposed 
to soldiers at the "lowest echelon") are essential for todays counter-
insurgency operations-and that these should be under a ground force 
commanders control.9l 
In any event, it seems clear that airpower has, rather unexpectedly; 
emerged as the capability of choice for the counterinsurgency fight. One need 
look no further than the fact that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance assets were General Petraeuss "top hardware priority in Iraq."92 Would 
it be efficient to give additional aerial platforms to the army officers who com-
plain that the Air Force is not filling enough of their requests for surveillance 
aircraft? Not likely Because the Air Force conducts "split operations"-
employing pilots in the United States to control large numbers of forward-
deployed unmanned aircaft-it is able to keep 88 percent of these unmanned 
planes operational.93 The army; however, can organize itself to deploy only 
about 30 percent of its unmanned aerial assets at any given time.94 
In truth, joint warfare is most powerful when individual services focus 
upon their core competencies. In a world where thousands of airmen are fill-
ing army billets because of shortages in ground force personnel, it makes 
no sense for a service to try to replicate the special capabilities of another 
service. Such duplication is not just unnecessarily costly; it also detracts from 
the combat power that interdependence might otherwise provide. Moreover, 
viewing the allocation of scarce resources as a scramble for slices of the "bud-
get pie" is profoundly unhelpful in preparing to meet the challenges of twen-
ty-first -century conflicts. 
The Future 
Despite the Air Forces current difficulties, the future of the service is bright 
if for no other reason than that airpower itself has demonstrated extra-
ordinary flexibility and utility across the spectrum of conflict. The recent 
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innovative and decisive applications of range airpower platforms in 
counterinsurgency settings are powerful indicators of the resilience of this 
central feature of the air weapon. That said, there is no doubt that the Air 
Force has much work to do if it is to become-and to be perceived as-a 
more effective and respected member of the joint team. 
At the fall 2008 meeting of the Air Force Association, General Norton 
Schwartz, Air Force chief of staff, alluded to an important principle seem-
ingly overlooked by too many of todays strategists-that is, that technology 
can allow the aerial warfighter to be far from the fight and still be essential 
to mission success. General Schwartz insisted, 'The value of an Airmans 
contribution is not measured by his or her proximity to the target. ... In fact, 
without [the airmens] expertise, no one would be near the target."95 General 
Schwartz$ point is that, notwithstanding the emotion the close fight may 
engender, the purpose of using force is to achieve certain effects, and to do 
so with the least risk to human beings. Airpower carries the most potential 
to achieve desired effects with the lowest risk.The real value of a military 
component is not its relative popularity in the body politic, but rather in its 
ability to deliver the intended results for the society it serves. Technology 
facilitates that end. Although many disparage the utility of high-technology 
weaponry, Americans need to appreciate that technology is, in fact, this 
countrys asymmetric advantage. Recently, strategic theorist Colin Gray 
noted that "high technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A 
high technology society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to fight, its 
wars in any other than a technology-led manner."96 
Overall, the "American way in warfare" has been the most successful in his-
tory In a real way, the technology-intensive nature of airpower makes it emi-
nently "American." To the extent it is abandoned or demeaned, the United 
States risks departing from a military approach that has the most promise to 
provide options to decision makers that, among other things, do not require 
placing masses of young Americans in harms way At the same time, air force 
leaders must be able to assist decision makers in their understanding of the mil-
itary arts, as well as the science of weaponry To do so effectively, they must com-
prehend fully, and be able to speak coherently about, the political, social, and 
economic contexts of twenty-first-century conflicts. In this area, the air force has 
much to learn from its sister services about how to produce leaders who are-
and who appear to be-ready to provide such comprehensive advice. 
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It is imperative that the Air Force cultivate airmen-particularly at the 
senior level-with a stronger ability to advocate airpower. Secretary Michael 
Donley seemed to recognize this need when he observed that 
we need to be prepared to engage-and if necessary debate-the 
major issues facing our Air Force. Good stewardship demands 
developing a deep understanding of the macro-level trends affect-
ing the Air Force .... As we do so, we will cultivate reasoned, care-
fully considered perspectives. We will be able to present these 
views not by digging in or staking out turf, but from a careful 
analysis and a seasoned appreciation of the many joint and 
national influences affecting today$ strategic decision-making.97 
In order to meet its challenges, the Air Force must be prepared to 
change those aspects of its culture that conflict with its large goals. It must 
also explore new means of reconciling the burdens of a highly demanding 
technical environment with the complex dynamics of human interactions, 
the mastery of which is proving so essential to success in twenty-first-
century warfare . 
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